Middle class values have long been perceived as drivers of social cohesion and growth. In this paper we investigate the relationship between class (measured by the position in the income distribution), values, and political orientations using comparable values surveys for six Latin American countries. We find that both a continuous measure of income and categorical measures of income-based class are robustly associated with values. Both income and class tend to display a similar association to values and political orientations as education, although differences persist in some important dimensions. Overall, we do not find strong evidence of any "middle class particularism": values appear to gradually shift with income, and middle class values lay between the ones of poorer and richer classes. If any, the only peculiarity of middle class values is moderation. We also find changes in values across countries to be of much larger magnitude than the ones dictated by income, education, and individual characteristics, suggesting that individual values vary primarily within bounds dictated by each society.
Introduction
The middle class has been described as "the backbone of both the market economy and of democracy in most advanced societies" ( Birdsall, Graham, and Pettinato 2000) . A large and stable middle class is claimed to induce economic growth ( Easterly 2001) , consumer demand ( Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989) , entrepreneurial development, and long-term investments ( Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997; Doepke and Zilibotti 2007) . The middle class has also been associated with political stability and social cohesion ( Barro 1999) . In a tradition epitomized by Lipset (1959) , 78, the segment neither affected by deprivation nor benefiting from wealth "plays a mitigating role in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and democratic parties and penalize extremist groups." Implicit in these assertions is the idea that the middle class holds a particular set of values and orientations that distinguish it from both its poorer and wealthier counterparts. A perspective that dates back to Weber, Max (2003 [1905 ) suggests that the middle class is the source of economic values that emphasize savings and accumulation of human capital, thus promoting economic growth. Also, given that the wellbeing of the middle class depends on specialized skills, this class is proclaimed to value long-term investments, in sharp contrast with the upper class, whose welfare relies, it is claimed, on capital and rental income ( Doepke and Zilibotti 2007) . The view of the middle class as a source of democratic development and stability also assumes that this group holds a specific set of political orientations. These values include a preference for moderation and stability over revolutionary change. Furthermore, given its relatively high levels of economic wellbeing, the middle class is purportedly more optimistic and confident regarding the future than the lower class, which would result in stronger support for the political institutions in place.
Understanding these values has gained policy and academic relevance thanks to declines in poverty in emerging countries, including Latin America, that have led to potential strengthening of the middle class ( Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010; World Bank 2011) . In order to track the evolution of the middle class, and before looking into the implications for the changes in societal values, a specific definition must be established. As discussed below, the notion of middle class has been widely discussed in the literature, and both absolute and relative approaches have been proposed. Most empirical studies of middle class values in emerging countries classify people in the middle class based on self perception of either status or position in the income distribution ( Amoranto, Chun, and Deolalikar 2010; OECD 2011; Pew Research Center 2008) , but self-reported status is a very poor predictor of someone's income, education or occupation. In this paper, following Ferreira et al. (2012) and Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2011) , the definition of middle class is based on the idea of economic security and takes a predicted income threshold, as a function of asset holdings, as a metric to approximate the concept. 1 The existence of a homogeneous set of middle class values is not necessarily obvious. Values emerge and change as a result of complex social and economic processes. On the one hand, with higher wealth and changing occupations may come new values. On the other, the middle class remains characterized by some degree of economic vulnerability, which may lead to tenuous differences in the values of the middle class and the poor in spite of differences in income levels ( Torche and Lopez-Calva (2013) ). 2 Yet, despite the relevance of the potential role of middle class value formation on important socioeconomic outcomes, these links remain to be understood. Theories of "middle class orientations" contrast with the scarcity of empirical research on the association of relative and absolute income positions with individuals' values, attitudes and behavior. Attempts to link middle class and values in developing countries use income measures ( Cárdenas, Kharas, and Henao 2011) , but are limited by the lack of accurate information about income in values surveys, which is either absent or classified in broad categories. Most studies also fail to compare income effects with relevant individual characteristics that could affect values (such as education or occupation), and that could be in part captured by income. In sum, despite the interest in the topic, there are few rigorous statistical analyses attempting to determine whether income-based measures of middle class status (as opposed to self-reported status) relate to specific values.
One of the channels through which middle classes are assumed to play a role in fostering growth and strengthening social cohesion is precisely through the association of middle class households to a specific value structure. In this paper we complement existing efforts to understand the links between class and values, advancing the empirical analysis along several dimensions. First, we attempt to address the generalized lack in values surveys of accurate information on income by constructing measures of permanent income based on asset ownership (see below, Section 3 for details). Second, we merge two strands of literature by looking at the association of values with both people's relative position in the income distribution, and absolute income levels that are comparable across countries. We also explore the possibility of nonlinearities in the relationship between income and values. Finally, for robustness, we consider other predictors of values, such as origin, education, and occupation, which in the sociological literature are also linked to middle class status ( Goldthorpe 2000) , and assess whether they relate more to people's values than income itself.
The paper addresses the following questions: How do political and social values vary across income and class? To what extent does class, as opposed to education and social origins, have a net association with values? And does the Latin American middle class hold specific values that distinguish it from both upper and lower classes, or the relationship between social classes and values is a monotonic one? It is important to state at the outset that our analysis will not claim to assert causality in the relationship between class and values. If the middle class is found to hold a particular set of values, we cannot establish that the level or sources of economic wellbeing that characterizes this class is the cause of observed values, as implicitly suggested by theories on the role of the middle class in economic development or political stability. Endogeneity due to omitted variable bias or to reverse causality prevents such causal interpretation. But, given the current status of research and the relevance of the question, documenting systematic variations in values and orientations across education, income, and occupation levels in emerging countries represents a first necessary step in understanding how the emergence of new middle classes will affect future growth and development prospects.
Literature
The economic literature has suggested that stronger middle classes lead to better institutions and foster economic growth ( Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock (2006) ). Allegedly, one of the channels through which these effects take place relates to the association between middle classes and values that are prone to stability and growth. 3 There are, of course, two steps needed to contrast this hypothesis. First, it must be established that middle classes are by themselves associated to specific values, controlling for other characteristics, including income. Second, the link between those values and economic growth must also be tested. This paper looks into the first step in that process. The values to be included in the analysis refer to transactions costs (such as trust and respect for institutions) and lower potential conflict (social tolerance, legitimization of violence), as well as entrepreneurship and aspirations (perceptions of mobility), all of them related to positive social outcomes, including growth.
Empirical studies trying to link middle classes -or middle income strata -to specific values are not very convincing. The task of establishing such empirical relation is not simple. That is one of the reasons why analyses of middle class values remain descriptive in nature. For example, the Pew Research Center (PRC) recently carried out two insightful studies analyzing the attitudes of the middle class. Pew Research Center (2009) defines the middle class in absolute monetary terms, and explores the hypothesis that the values of the middle classes in emerging countries tend to reflect similar opinions to those of industrialized ones on democracy and social issues, once a certain level of wealth is reached. 4 Compared with the lower classes, the report shows that the middle class assigns a higher importance to democratic institutions and individual liberties, considers religion less central to their lives, and holds more liberal social values. The report fails, however, in looking at "middle class particularisms", as it does not report if the observed differences are statistically significant, and does not consider whether middle class values differ with the one of the upper classes. In Pew Research Center (2008), a public opinion survey was conducted among a nationally representative sample of US adults, to collect information on which social group people perceive themselves to be a part of (lower, middle or upper class) and their views on different values and perceptions about the future. The results show that 53% of adults in the US state that they are middle class, but roughly 80% indicate that it has become harder to sustain their current lifestyle, which suggests that, while wealthier than the poor, the middle class remains vulnerable to shocks.
Along the same lines, the OECD's Latin America Economic Outlook (2011) makes a serious effort to analyze the attitudes of the Latin American middle class towards democracy, fiscal policy, and redistribution. It shows that the Latin American middle class supports democracy -yet remains dissatisfied with how democracy actually functions. Regarding taxation and public services, it finds that the Latin American middle class is more likely than other groups to consider that citizens should pay their taxes, and less likely to consider that taxes are too high or to justify tax evasion. The middle class is also less satisfied with the provision of public services, compared to the more affluent. The analysis, however, is based on households' self perceived position in the income distribution, which can differ substantially from their actual position (see below).
Using data from the World Values Survey for 80 countries, Amoranto, Chun, and Deolalikar (2010) examine how perceived class status relates to values that may be associated with higher economic growth and greater accountability in public services. They find that people who perceive themselves as middle class are found to have values that are more likely to contribute to economic growth than the lower class for six indices, but generally have less liberal values and attitudes than the upper class in terms of market competition, gender equality, upward mobility, and trust. As in OECD (2011), however, they base the analysis on self perceived status. Fischer and Torgler (2007) use data for 26 countries from the 1998 International Social Survey Programme to examine the association between relative income position and several measures of social capital, such as generalized trust, confidence in institutions, compliance with social norms, and civic engagement. Relative position is measured as the difference between an individual's income and the reference group income at the aggregate level (national or regional). They find that relative income matters for most measures of social capital, such that social capital rises with an improved relative income position and declines with a disadvantage in the relative income position. The strongest effect is observable for happiness, compliance with social norms, and generalized trust. Cárdenas, Kharas, and Henao (2011) are among the few studies looking at how absolute income levels relate to values. They define the middle class as people with per capita daily income falling between $10 and $100 in PPP terms, and analyze the middle class' attitudes and values using the World Values Survey data for Peru. Contrary to previous findings, the authors suggest that the middle class in that country sees taxes as a redistributive transfer from them to the poor and are not inclined to support them. Furthermore, the middle class was found to have a high preference for free markets and support for private industry and competition. Their results also show a relative decline in the support for state-owned enterprises and the government as the owner of businesses, and a primacy of growth policies, which suggests that the middle class may be optimistic about their own potential but skeptical of the role of the state. The income variable is however characterized by strong measurement errors as it is based on large income bands. Moreover, only one percent of the Peruvian population earns above U$100 a day, which questions the representativity of the population sample they use to estimate the values of the upper class. Tóth and Keller (2011) analyze how the redistributive preferences of middle classes relate to actual income and to its distribution in contexts with different levels of income inequality. Using principal component analysis, they construct a composite index of redistribution preference based on the desirability of redistribution and state involvement in providing jobs, education, and social expenditures. The analysis suggests that redistributive preferences of those in the middle are higher if they live in a society where many people feel poor and only a few feel rich. In a related paper, in line with individuals' attitudes towards redistribution, Reed-Arthurs and Sherin (2010) employ data on taxation and fairness to find that Americans' demand for redistribution to the poor is influenced by many factors (altruism, political ideology and values), while demand for redistribution to the middle class appears to be driven by self-interest and knowledge of the tax system.
Although the middle class is not at the core of their analysis, a recent study by Cruces, Pérez Truglia, and Tetaz (2011b) provides relevant evidence on how individuals form perceptions with strong biases to the evaluation of their own relative position in the distribution. Using data for the Greater Buenos Aires, they assess the relevance of such biases by examining their impact on attitudes towards redistributive policies. An important characteristic of the survey lies in its experimental design, as the interviewer informs a randomly selected group of respondents whether their subjective income position coincides with the objective figures. They find that respondents who were relatively poorer than they had thought became more supportive of redistribution to the poor when informed of their true income rank, while for those with negative biases (i.e. who were relatively wealthier than they had thought), there are no significant results.
Our analysis adds to these studies by looking at the extent to which income-based measures of middle class status are associated with values (as opposed to self reported status), and by making an attempt to derive more accurate measures of income than what is currently reported in values surveys.
Data and methodology
Our analysis draws on the 2007 Ecosocial values surveys. These values surveys were implemented by CIEPLAN, a Latin American Think Tank, in seven Latin American countries -Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. The surveys are representative of the adult population (18 years or more) living in larger urban centers in each country. The sampling design is probabilistic and multistage, and the questionnaire was applied through face-to-face interviews in the respondents' household. We choose to use the Ecosocial surveys because of their rigorous sampling methodology, the information they collect on a variety of values, and because they collect information about households' assets, which will allow us to construct a measure of households' permanent income (see below). We exclude Argentina from the analysis because we were not able to match assets with other surveys and build an income measure. The analysis is therefore based on a pooled dataset combining six countries that was created from the national datasets, with a total sample size of 12,297 observations.
The outcomes of interest, our dependent variables, are the values and attitudes regarding political, economic, and social issues. Because of the large number of questions asked in the surveys, and likely similarity of answers within themes, we group questions using principal component analysis (PCA), and create thematic "values indexes." Principal component analysis reduces the dimensionality of a data set with a large number of interrelated variables, while retaining as much variation as possible, by mapping old variables into a new set of variables, the principal components, ordered so that the first few retain most of the variation present in all of the original variables ( Stevens 2002; Jolliffe 2002) . The technique used is robust to different formulations of the variables that are used, accommodating continuous, dichotomous, and ordinal variables.
We create the "values indexes" as follows. We select first a series of survey questions capturing orientations that are plausibly related with each other. We then extract the weights of each variable in the first principal component (the linear combination that accounts for the largest proportion of the variance across all items), and compute predicted values of the principal component for each observation in the dataset. These new summary variables constitute the dependent variables of our analysis. For example, the value index "trust in institutions" in our analysis is based on five items, ascertaining trust in the following institutions: the national government, congress, political parties, the mayor, and the police. In building the principal component, we discard variables presenting a high uniqueness (the proportion of the variance that is not accounted for by the principal component). We use a conventional uniqueness cutoff of 0.90, which signals that the value item in question is very weakly correlated with the common variation across all items, and therefore adds unrelated information. This technique allows substantive decision making in terms of the items selected to identify each value index, while at the same time preventing arbitrary combination of items that are only weakly correlated. Observe, also, that by extracting the first principal component we retain the variance that is shared across all items, such that the idiosyncratic determinants of each individual item (for example, misunderstanding of a particular survey question) are ruled out.
In addition to creating several "values indices," we include single indicators that provide important information in and of themselves -for example, whether respondents voted in presidential elections. Together, the indices and single indicators comprise our 11 dependent variables, namely: trust in institutions; political alienation; perception of mobility and opportunity; support for individual rights; legitimization of political violence; voting; social tolerance; nationalism; political ideology; interpersonal trust; and interpersonal alienation. These values are related to lower transaction costs, lower potential for conflict, higher entrepreneurship, and potentially higher growth. For a complete list of the indicators and questions included in each dimension see the Annex.
Our main independent variable refers to the class position of the respondent, based on the per capita income level of his/her household. In order for the household income to accurately represent the respondents' class, selection was limited to respondents 25 years old and older. The main challenge in determining household income is the absence of an accurate variable capturing income in most values surveys. Income is in fact unavailable in the Ecosocial survey, which contains, however information on a series of household goods and assets. We use therefore information of households' assets to construct a measure of households' permanent income -the long-term level of economic wellbeing purged from short-term volatility and measurement error ( Torche 2009 ).
To do so, we match assets in Ecosocial with assets from an "external" household survey in each country that contains information on both assets and households' income. 5 Using these external surveys, we run a regression model predicting logged per capita household income by means of the set of household goods and assets, controlling for the household head's education and the log of household size. The coefficients obtained for the household goods and assets are then used in Ecosocial to predict, using the same set of assets and household characteristics, (logged) per capita income for each household. This technique closely resembles the twosample instrumental variable approach used to examine intergenerational income elasticity, when information on parental income is unavailable in the focal survey ( Angrist and Krueger 1992; Arellano and Meghir 1992) . To achieve comparability across countries, we convert each income variable in 2005 USD PPP terms.
For our purposes, the derived measure has a double advantage. First, and most importantly, it solves the lack of accurate information on income in values surveys. Second, being based on assets, it summarizes households' wealth (and thus a longer-term average of households' income), which is more likely to be associated with values than current, transitory income.
Next, we use the permanent household income as a regressor in our models. We construct the measure of social class from the values of predicted household income that we call absolute measures of class. Absolute class is based on fixed monetary thresholds that relate to different levels of "vulnerability to poverty" (probability to fall into poverty, Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez 2011), and distinguishes four classes: lower class (households with a monthly per capita income below $4 in PPP terms), lower-middle class (households with an income between $4 and $10), middle class (households with an income between $10 and $20), and upper-middle class (households with an income above $20). We refrain from introducing an upper class with income above $50 or $100 because of very few households earning these incomes in Latin America (typically, around two percent of the sample), which would question the representativity of our results. In using 10 dollars a day as our middle class threshold, we follow analyses that have looked at vulnerability to poverty as a prerequisite to middle class status. These analyses find that if the middle class threshold is set excessively close to the poverty threshold, then people remain excessively vulnerable to shocks that would bring them back into poverty and may not behave differently than the poor (see Goldthorpe and McKnight 2004; Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez 2011). 6 In addition to income, we also include control variables capturing exogenous characteristics of individuals: age and age squared, sex, race/ethnicity, and mother's and father's education. To these variables, we add the respondents' education. In a robustness exercise, we also add occupation. Race/ethnicity distinguishes the following categories: White, Black, Indigenous, and Mixed. For education, we harmonize information across countries and generate a homogeneous variable with 10 categories. 7 While, to ease the presentation of the results, we present regression results treating education as a continuous variable with 10 values, all results hold thru considering an (imperfect) measure of years of education constructed out of these categories. All regressions include country effects to capture baseline differences in values and attitudes across countries. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables. Table 2 presents the social class distribution based on Ecosocial, and the dollar thresholds that define relative social classes in each country. Under a relative definition, the middle class accounts for about one-third of the households. In absolute terms, about 40% of households in the countries included in the analysis have a per-capita income between $4 and $10, and another 27% of households have a per-capita income between $10 and $20 per month. The absolute and relative class definitions, while correlated because of the similarity in income levels across the countries we investigate, capture different concepts. The absolute definition of class is expected to capture differences in absolute levels of economic wellbeing. Under an "absolute" perspective, the middle class is plausibly a source of growth and entrepreneurship as it emphasizes values such as savings and education. In contrast, the country-specific relative middle class is the group placed in the middle of the income distribution in each country, and therefore, likely to provide a moderating political force and to promote socio-political stability by creating a bridge between the poor and the rich. Both classifications, through the use of dummy variables, are designed to capture non-linearities in the association between income and values. Table 2 offers the pair-wise correlations across all outcome variables -value indices and indicators. Correlations are generally low, suggesting that these measures capture different types of values and orientations. The comparison suggests that trust in institutions is related with attachment to the political system (in its negative form, as political alienation), and, to a lesser degree, with interpersonal trust and interpersonal alienation. Perceived equality of opportunity is also higher among those who trust and are more engaged with the political system. In a different cluster, interpersonal alienation is related to the legitimization of violence and with nationalistic orientations. Interestingly, institutional and interpersonal trust does not translate into higher levels of tolerance. In fact, social tolerance is positively (albeit weakly) correlated with political alienation and nationalism. Finally, support for individual rights, vote, and left-right ideology are relatively orthogonal to other dimensions. Table 2 : Correlation between dimensions of political orientations, ECOSOCIAL dataset. The estimations are based OLS regression with robust standard errors, to account for the built-in heteroskedasticity in linear probability models. We discuss five specifications for each dependent variable. In the first specification, we include only exogenous variables -i.e. sex, age, race, father's and mother's education, and country effects. We add next the respondent's education. We then control for the logarithm of per capita household income. Finally, we replace log income with absolute and relative class positions.
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Results
We begin the analysis by looking at the existence of an association between (the logarithm of) income and values in addition to any association that already exists with individual characteristics and education. We then look for class-specific effects to explore whether there are non-linearities in such a relationship that could support the hypothesis that values of the middle class differ from the ones of lower and upper classes. Although, in what follows, we regress each value individually on income and class status, we shall focus the description of results on associations that hold across values. Table 2 shows the regression results. For each group of values, it shows three different regressions: regression (I) only contains individual characteristics (including respondents' education levels), and country dummies; regression (II) adds to it the logarithm of the estimated per capita income; and regression (III) looks for nonlinearities in the relationship between values and income by repeating the analysis with income classes, as opposed to imposing a linear relation with income. The classes we consider are the poor (the omitted category), with a daily per capita income below 4 dollars a day in purchasing power parity terms; the lower-middle class, with a daily per capita income between 4 and 10 dollars; the middle class, with a per capita income between 10 and 20 dollars; and the upper-middle class, with a per capita income between 20 and 50 dollars. We exclude people earning more than 50 dollars a day since there are very few of them, and the analysis may fail to be representative of such a class.
Overall, we find a robust and positive association between values, beliefs, and (the logarithm of) income: higher income is associated with more trust in institutions (an index based on how much individuals trust the government, congress, political parties, the mayor, and the police); lower political alienation (the perceived extent to which people in power care about people similar to the respondents as opposed to taking advantage of them); a stronger perception of opportunities (the degree of perceived meritocracy in society and the perceived easiness of poor people to overcome poverty); less support of individual rights under any circumstances (whether criminals should have the same individual rights than others); less legitimization of political violence (the use of violence to achieve socially desirable goals); a higher likelihood of voting; a political ideology leaning towards the right; a stronger belief that people can, in general, be trusted; and lower interpersonal alienation (the belief that what happens to a person does not count much). Overall, the relationship between income and values and beliefs tends, with a few exceptions, to have the same sign of the coefficient associated with education: the effect is, however, in addition to the one for education.
Despite the significant relationship between values and income, the analysis provides little support for theories attributing special merits to the middle classes. Regressions (III) in Table 2 repeat the analysis on a class-by-class basis. The class analysis shows that most values and beliefs tend to vary monotonically with income, and those of the middle class tend to be between those of the poor and the rich. The only two exceptions are the support for individual rights under any circumstances (where the two classes in the middle seem to exhibit less support than the poorer and richer classes), and social tolerance (captured by tolerance for individual traits such as race and homosexuality), where the middle classes exhibit higher tolerance than the poorer and richer classes. If anything, the only value that consistently emerges from the analysis is moderation. Values of the middle class are repeatedly and consistently more moderate than those of people at the extremes of the income (and education) distribution. That in itself is a noteworthy finding that may affect the shaping of social and economic policies, as moderation can in itself represent a force of social cohesion that intermediates between the rich and the poor.
Observe that these differences should not be interpreted causally. On the one hand, values may drive success: for instance, people who believe in meritocracy may perform better in life. On the other hand, differences in values may reflect the reality of Latin American societies, where wealthier classes live in a different world that is closer to the political process and that may bear more influence on social and political decisions. Such a view may be reinforced by the fact that the class that seems to most distinguish itself from the poor (people with incomes below US$4 a day, the "omitted" class in the analysis) comprises people earning between US$20 and US$50 a day. Causal interpretations notwithstanding, the findings suggest that income is a relevant predictor of political and social orientations. 8 Observe, also, that the variation in values that is associated with income and education remains much smaller than the variation in values across countries (i.e. the magnitude of the income class coefficients remains smaller than the magnitude of the country coefficients). The strong cross-country variation undermines further the supposition that the middle classes share common values across Latin America that can lead to greater social cohesion and economic prosperity. Values appear to be, to some extent, circumstantial and driven by changing challenges and socioeconomic environments. And while the values of the middle class show moderation, they do so only within boundaries dictated by society.
Finally, despite the statistically significant associations, the magnitude of the income effects remains fairly small, suggesting that income explains only a small fraction of the variation in values. In fact, even by looking at all the explanatory variables together (which include, in addition to income, individual characteristics and country effects), the proportion of the overall variation in values that is explained by the regressions remains fairly small. The R-squared of the regressions (a measure of how much the regressions are able to "capture" the variation in values) remain overall very low, between 1.4 and 15.2 percent. That means that 85 percent or more of the variation in values remains unexplained. This poor performance of income and education (and of other individual characteristics, such as age, gender, and ethnicity that are included in the regressions) suggests that other factors must also influence values. To address this possibility, we run the same regressions as in the baseline analysis, but adding people's occupation to it. Using occupational status available in Ecosocial, we classify occupations into unskilled jobs, self-employed, manual skilled, clerical (low), clerical (high), professional independents, high professional executives, students, and people not in the labor force. Although we find that some occupations (in particular, high professional executives) show some association with values, the association for most categories (after correcting for individual characteristics, income, and education) remains weaker than the one for income. Moreover, adding occupation only marginally improves the R-squared. The exercise suggests therefore that values associate poorly with many definitions of the middle class, not only income-related ones.
This should not be surprising at all. Over the past century, the middle class has been tolerating extremist movements as much as it supported reforms. For instance, an influential 1967 article about the relationship of middle classes and military regimes asserts that the middle class aspires to become part of the elite and is willing to abandon democratic values when it perceives a threat to its own class status ( Nun 1967) . The moderation of middle-class values may, therefore, reflect a pragmatic attitude. Using an example based on our indicators, economic success may engender in the middle class more trust in institutions and a stronger perception of opportunities in life, but, at the same time, the middle classes are not ready to support individual rights of criminals that have undermined law and order, a necessity for prosperous economic activity.
Conclusions
Income associates significantly with political values, beliefs, and orientations, even when variables capturing social background (parents' education, age, sex, ethnicity), education, and occupation have been accounted for. While the relationship does not necessarily imply a causal impact of income on values, the findings suggest that income is a relevant predictor of political and social orientations. However, we do not find strong evidence of a middle class particularism. The relationship between income and political orientations remains, for the most part, monotonic: as people grow richer, they gradually change values.
Moreover, the association of income (and other individual characteristics) with values tends to be lower than the association captured by the country effects. The country dummies do capture, to a certain extent, the effects of average income and education levels in each country. But they also capture societal values that can differ strongly across countries, and this research suggests that individual values move primarily within bounds dictated by each society. Finally, our analysis shows that values survey analyses tend to capture only a fraction of the overall variance in values (as indicated by the relatively low R squared), which suggest that other unobserved characteristics may play an important role.
